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Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp.:
The Sixth Circuit Provides the "Solution"
to Virginia Bankshares' Causation Query
INTRODUCTION

The litigants in the Sixth Circuit's recently decided Howing Co. v.
Naionwide Corp. (Howing1JH)' have found themselves, for the second time,
at the forefront of the law's evolution.2 Beginning with the 1982 decision of
Nationwide's directors to take the corporation private through a freeze-out
merger,3 the litigants have spent the past ten years rotating among the various
courts of the federal system. The issues that the courts have confronted have

revolved around section 13(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19344 and
1 972 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1992), cer. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1645 (1993) [hereinafter
Howing ll].
2 In its first decision concerning the Howing litigation, the Sixth Circuit became the
first court of appeals in the nation to recognize an implied private right of action under
§ 13(e) of the Securities Exchange Act. See Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d
1470, 1474 (6th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Howing 1].
3 See Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 625 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. Ohio 1985). In
general, "going private" occurs when the ownership of a corporation is significantly
contracted by a majority shareholder or some other controlling group and is usually
accomplished through one or two transactions. For example, when a diffuse group of
shareholders own a large percentage of a class of a corporation's shares, the first step in
"going private" will often be a tender offer. Once enough outside shareholders have been
eliminated, the corporation can seek to further concentrate ownership through compulsory
means. A merger accomplished by the compulsion of some or all of the minority
shareholders is commonly termed a "freeze-out." See Committee on Corporate Laws,
Guidelines on Going Private, 37 Bus. LAw. 313, 314-15 (1981). For further information
on "going private" and "f'eeze-out" transactions, see generally John P. McGarrity,
Freezeouts Under the 1983 illinois Business Corporation Act: The Need for Protection
ofMinority Shareholdersfrom "GoingPrivate" Mergers, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 679, 68183 (1985); Edward D. Kleinbard, Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.L 903, 909-11 (1975).
4 Section 13(e), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1988), was added along with
§ 13(d) and §§ 14(d)-(f) as part of the Williams Act in 1968. These provisions resulted,
in part, from a growing concern over corporate takeover attempts and the perceived
unfaimess to an investor who finds himself in the midst of a struggle for corporate
control. While in its early drafting stages the Williams Act had been seen as a device to
foil corporate raiders, the law as enacted gave neither management nor the party seeking
to gain control of the corporation any advantage over the investor. Conforming to the
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Rule 13e-3 issued pursuant to it' and have principally concerned whether
adequate disclosure was made by Nationwide to its shareholders during
the merger and, if not, what harm was caused the shareholders.
Specifically, in Howing IlI the court addressed the following question:
Does it matter whether adequate disclosure is made when the party
favoring the merger akeady possesses the votes needed to approve it?6
In Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,7 the Supreme Court at least

partially answered that question.' The case involved former shareholders
of a subsequently merged corporation who claimed damages, based on

inadequate disclosure, arising from the merger? Remarking that the
former shareholders were members of a class of minority shareholders

without enough votes to block the merger" and without any legal rights
that could have prevented the merger or mitigated any resulting damages,
the Court rejected their claim." The Court held that the shareholders
could not show that,2 had adequate disclosure been made, they would not
have suffered harm
What was left unanswered by Virginia Bankshares was whether
minority shareholders who do have such legal rights can claim damages.
More particularly, if the lack of adequate disclosure induces the

shareholders to forego a state law remedy, can causation be satisfied so
as to show damages arising from a violation of the federal securities

laws? 3 This Note shall analyze the Sixth Circuit's resolution of that
question in Howing /I."4 Part I provides a brief explanation of Rule

Williams Act's"neutral" approach, § 13(e) gives the Securities and Exchange Commission
the authority to regulate a corporation's repurchase of its own securities. See generally 5
Louis Loss & JOEL SELiGMAN, SEcuRTEs REGuLATION 2161-67 (3d ed. 1990)
(discussing the history of the Williams Act).
17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1992); see infra notes 32-49 and accompanying text
(discussing the reporting requirements of § 13(e) and Rule 13e-3).
6 Howing HI, 972 F.2d 700, 705 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1645
(1993).
' 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991). Virginia Bankshares concerned Rule 14a-9 rather than
13e-3. See infra notes 19-23 (distinguishing Rule 14a-9 from Rule 13e-3).
' See infra notes 137-51 and accompanying text (outlining the Virginia Banklhares
decision).
9Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2756.
"Id. at 2761.
Id. at 2766.
12Id. at 2755.
13 See id. at 2766.
14It is the attempt of this Note to examine the last state remedy causation issue as
it was presented before the Sixth Circuit. To that end, it will focus narrowly on issues of
relevance to causation and the Supreme Court's decision in Virginia Bankshares. It will
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13e-3, and then recounts the saga of the Howing Company cases
culminating in Howing IIL.15 Part II surveys the development of the
doctrine concerning causation of damages in suits based upon implied
private rights of action under the federal securities disclosure laws.
Part I addresses the Sixth Circuit's synthesis of Virginia Bankshares and

earlier cases in reaching its conclusion that a foregone state law remedy
is sufficient to show causation. 17 Finally, Part IV questions the
correctness of the Sixth Circuit's decision."
. FROM RULE 13e-3 AND rrs
BRETHREN TO HOWING Ill
A.

Rule 10b-5, Rule 14a-9, and Rule 13e-3

Rules lOb-5, 14a-9, and 13e-3 are the subjects of a great deal of
judicial interplay. While Rule lOb-5 9 concerns the purchase and sale of
securities, Rule 14a-92" concerns proxy solicitations and Rule 13e-32'
concerns "going private" transactions, the similarity of language and
purpose among the three rules often leads courts to treat reasoning

applicable to one rule as equally applicable to the others. For example,
each rule stresses that, in whatever context a shareholder is contacted, the
shareholder must have all relevant facts assembled before him in such a

not discuss concerns about using the federal courts to enforce state law remedies, such
as those raised by the Court in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court was confronted with the Second Circuit's holding
that Rule lOb-5, see infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text, reached breaches of
fiduciary duty even in the absence of faulty disclosure. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 470.
The Court rejected that interpretation of Rule lOb-5. Id. at 474-77. Furthermore, in Part
IV of the opinion, the Court expressed grave reservations about extending the federal
securities laws into areas traditionally left to state corporate law without clear

Congressional authority. Id. at 477-80.

u See infra notes 19-94 and accompanying text.
16See infra notes 95-151 and accompanying text.

17See infra notes 152-77 and accompanying text.
"'See infra notes 178-206 and accompanying text.
'9 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
' Id. § 240.14a-9.
21
Id. § 240.13e-3. Depending upon the precise fornm of a subject transaction, the rule
requires disclosure of certain information in "the proxy statement, the information
statement, the registration statement or the tender offer for or request or invitation for
tenders of securities published, sent or given away to security holders, respectively." See
id § 240.13e-3(e)(1).
' See supra note 3 (defining "going private" transactions).
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fashion that no misleading impression is made. Thus, the emphasis of
each rule is full disclosure 4
Despite the absence of express private rights of action in the sections
of the securities acts upon which these rules are based, courts have
implied rights of action for persons who have suffered injuries as a result
of another's violation of the rules. The Supreme Court has long

" Compare the language of Rule lOb-5:
It shall be unlawfil for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, ... in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992), with that of Rule 14a-9(a):
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any
proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication,
written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of
the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect
to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary to make
the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any
statement in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a
proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has become false or
misleading.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1992), and that of Rule 13e-3(b)(1):
It shall be a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice, in
connection with a Rule 13e-3 transaction, for [a Rule 13e-3 issuer] directly or

indirectly
(ii) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading;
17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(b)(1)(ii) (1992).
2A lOb-5(a) and lOb-5(c) also contain provisions concerning fraud that are identical
to those of 13e-3(b)(1)(i) and 13e-3(b)(1)(iii), respectively. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a),
(c) (1992); id. § 240.13e-3(b)(1)(i), (iii); see also infra note 25 (describing the statutory
authority for these rules). Although the cited provisions of Rules lOb-5 and 13e-3 serve
important anti-fraud purposes beyond full disclosure, the provisions are primarily
disclosure provisions and are, therefore, readily comparable to Rule 14a-9.
2' Rules lOb-5 and 14a-9 are issued in accordance with §§ 10(b) and 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1981) and 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(a) (1981), respectively). Rule 13e-3 is issued under the authority of §§ 17(a) and
19 of the Securities Act of 1933, and §§ 3(b), 10(b), 13(e), 14(a), 14(c), 14(e) and 23(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Exchange Act Release No. 33,610, 44 Fed.
Reg. 46,736, 46,736 (Aug. 8, 1979).
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recognized private rights of action for violations of 14a-926 and lOb527 However, since the Supreme Court's 1975 decision in Cort v.

Ash, s the Court has become increasingly uneasy about implying private
rights of action from statutes' Consequently, while some lower courts
have implied a private right of action under Rule 13e-3, 0 there is a
vigorous debate over whether implying such a private right of action
3
is proper. 1

Section 13(e) concerns issuer repurchases of its own stock. 2 Rule

13e-3 applies33 if those repurchases have a "reasonable likelihood or a

purpose"'

of either causing the stock to be held "by less than 300

persons" or disqualifying a class of equity securities that are listed on a
national securities exchange or authorized to be quoted on an automated
trading system from such a listing.35 Considering that the common

elements behind these two results are the cessation of any significant

26 .I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).

' Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971).
Unlike a 14a-9 right of action, the Court has held scienter to be a prerequisite to a private
action under Rule lOb-5. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
' 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (outlining a four-factor test for determining whether a court
can imply a private cause of action in a statute that does not expressly provide for one).
29See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TE LAW OF SECURTEs REGuiAiON § 13.1 (2d ed.
1990).
30 See, e.g., Howing 1, 826 F.2d 1470, 1476 (6th Cir. 1987).
" Compare Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-14185, 42 Fed. Reg. 60,090, 60,099-60,100 (Nov. 23,
1977) (endorsing an implied private right of action under Rule 13e-3) and Mary C.
Burson, Note, Securities Law: An Argument for Recognition ofan Implied Private Cause
of Action for Shareholders Under Section 13(e) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934
in the Context of Going Private, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 606 (1989) (arguing for a
private right of action) with Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Some Unfinished Business, Some
Unresolved Issues: Section 13(e) and the SEC's Going-Private Rules after Howing Co.
v. Nationwide Corp., 20 U. TOL. L. REv. 625, 632-53 (1989) (criticizing the Howing
court's recognition of a private right of action).
32 See supra note 4 (discussing enactment of § 13(e)). Rule 13e-3 also applies to
"affiliates" of the issuer, defined as persons "that directly or indirectly through one or
more intermediaries [control, are] controlled by, or [are] under common control with such
issuer." 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(a)(1) (1992).
"Rule
13e-3 applies to a corporation whose equity would be required to be
registered under § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act or a "closed-end investment
company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940." 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e3(b)(1) (1992). Rule 13e-3 also applies to an issuer of securities subject to § 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act, but the requirements are somewhat different for such an issuer.
See id. § 240.13e-3(c); see infra note 36 (distinguishing § 12 from § 15(d) issuers).
17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(a)(3) (1992).
I"Ad.
§ 240.13e-3(a)(3)(ii).
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significant reduction in the available market for selling the securities, a

minority shareholder of a company that has undergone a
Rule 13e-3
transaction is in a significantly weakened position. 7 Consequently, Rule

13e-3 constitutes such a shareholder's last opportunity to have the
advantage of extensive reporting requirements.

Schedule 13E-3' explains what a company undergoing a Rule 13e-3
transaction must disclose. The schedule must be filed with the SEC39
and distributed to the shareholders4 Although most of the items on the
schedule concern ordinary information that would have to be disclosed in

many other securities transactions,"

Items 7, 8, and 9 are quite

different.42 Item 7 requires disclosure of the purpose of the transaction,

its likely effects, the reasons for its structure, and whether any alternatives
to it exist.43 Item 9 requires information relating to outside opinions on
the value of the shares and the fairness of the transaction." Item 8, the
most controversial portion 5 of Schedule 13E-3, is the broadest in scope.
Item 8(a) requires the party filing the schedule to state whether it

"reasonably believes that the Rule 13e-3 transaction is fair or unfair" to
parties not connected with the transaction. A statement that the issuer
6

The Securities Exchange Act imposes periodic reporting requirements on securities
registered under § 12. Section 12 requires registration of securities traded on a national
securities exchange, 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1988), and of equity securities of issuers with
more than $1,000,000 in assets that are held by 500 or more persons and traded in
interstate commerce. Id. § 781(g)(1). The Securities Exchange Act also imposes periodic
reporting requirements on securities subject to § 15(d), which applies to securities held
by 300 or more, but less than 500 persons. Id. § 780(d).
37 See Kleinbard, supra note 3, at 916-17.
31 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1992).
31Id. § 240.13e-3(d).
40 Id. § 240.13e-3(e). One item, Item 17, requires that certain exhibits be filed with
the SEC, but does not require that the exhibits be sent to the shareholders. See id.
§ 240.13e-100, Item 17.
41 E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1992) (name of issuer and class of security); see
Kofele-Kale, supra note 31, at 668-69 (discussing general disclosure information under

Items 1-6 and 10-15 of Schedule 13E-3).
42

See Kofele-Kale, supra note 31, at 669-70 (comparing and contrasting Items 7, 8,

and 9).
43 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100, Item 7 (1992). The effects that must be described
include the effects on the issuer and on shareholders not affiliated with the issuer. Id.
44 See id. § 240.13e-100, Item 9.
4.S ee Harold N. Iselin, Note, Regulating GoingPrivate Transactions: SEC Rule 13e3, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1980) (arguing that Item 8 exceeds the SEC's rulemaking
authority by indirectly regulating the substantive fairness of Rule 13e-3 transactions).
24 0
4' 17 C.F.R. §
.13e-100, Item 8(a) (1992).
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has no belief whatsoever is insufficient. 47 Item 8(b), in turn, requires the
issuer to "[d]iscuss in reasonable detail the material factors upon which"
the belief concerning the fairness of the transaction was based and, "to
the extent practicable, the weight assigned to each such factor."'
Conclusory statements are not sufficient, and the factors normally
included in such a discussion are quite complex.49 Allegedly misleading
disclosure under Items 7, 8, and 9 formed the basis of the Howing
shareholders' clainm
B. The Howing Cases
Originally incorporated as Services Insurance Agency in 1947,
Nationwide Corporation became associated with the Nationwide Insurance
Companies in 1955 and, at that time, assumed its present name. Through
continual growth Nationwide became one of the largest insurance
companies in the United States,5' with subsidiaries engaged in the life
insurance, accident and health insurance, and annuity businesses. In
order to link Nationwide Corporation to the other members of the
Nationwide insurance group, a special class of stock (Class B) was issued
to only two other Nationwide companies: Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company and Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company. The Class A
shares were held by the public.' The voting rights of Nationwide
Corporation were structured so that as long as the Class B shares were
not less than forty percent of the total shares outstanding, the Class B
Shareholders would hold one-half of the voting power. This arrangement
assured Nationwide Mutual and Nationwide Mutual Fire of effective
control of Nationwide Corporation.'
47Id.

§ 240.13e-100, Item 8(a), Instruction.
Id. § 240.13e-l00, Item 8(b).
Id. § 240.13e-100, Item 8(b), Instructions. The instructions to Item 8(b) state that

the relevant factors will normally include current market prices, historical market value,
net book value, going concern value, and liquidation value of the company. Id. As well,

the factors normally relevant under 8(b) include Item 8(c)-(e) concerning the degree of
participation by the minority shareholders and the minority directors in the transaction.
See id.
'~ See infra notes 51-68 and accompanying text (discussing the factual history behind
the Howing cases).
" Howing I, 826 F.2d 1470, 1471 (6th Cir. 1987).
'2Efros v. Nationwide Corp., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)

99,077, at 95,117 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
Howing I, 826 F.2d at 1471.
14

Id. at 1472.
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In 1978, Nationwide Mutual and Nationwide Mutual Fire began to
eliminate public ownership of Nationwide Corporation by making a
tender offer for the Class A stock that resulted in the acquisition of
4,074,695 shares.' Nationwide Mutual and Nationwide Mutual Fire
continued to purchase the Class A shares in the open market until 1982,

at which time the two companies owned 85.6% of the Class A stock
outstanding. 6 In September of that year, Nationwide Mutual informally
proposed a merger between itself and Nationwide Corporation.' On

November 2, 1982, Nationwide Corporation's independent directors,
representing the interests of the public stockholders of Nationwide

Corporation, met with representatives of the First Boston Corporation, an
investment banking company59 that had determined that $42.50 per

share was a fair price for the stock. The independent directors decided in
favor of the merger,' and the next day Nationwide Corporation's Board
of Directors unanimously voted for the merger. Proxy solicitations were
mailed in December to the approximately 4,000 shareholders, informing

them of the proposed merger, asking for their support, and announcing
that the shareholders would vote on whether to pursue the merger on
January 18, 1983.61

Belle Efros, a holder of only 51 shares,62 took the first legal action

against the merger by seeking an injunction to prevent the January 18
meeting. Her only recourse was to stop the meeting because, if the

meeting occurred, the number of shares possessed by Nationwide Mutual
and Nationwide Mutual Fire assured the merger's approval. She failed,
'5 Id. The tender offer was for twenty dollars per share. Id.
Id. The prices at which they purchased in the market ranged from $22.50 to
$24.64. Id.
Hawing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 625 F. Supp. 146, 148 (S.D. Ohio 1985)
(quoting Nationwide Corporation's proxy statement of December 9, 1982).
5' These directors were five Class A shareholders who were neither employees of
Nationwide nor directors, employees or officers of Nationwide Mutual or Nationwide
Mutual Fire. Id at 149. Experts have advocated the use of independent directors in order
to ensure the adequate representation of minority shareholders in mergers. See Guidelines
on Going Private, supra note 3, at 327.
s9 Efros v. Nationwide Corp., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
99,077, at 95,118 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
o The independent directors retained the right to cancel the merger "on behalf of
Nationwide's Board of Directors!' if First Boston withdrew its opinion on the fairness of
the price, a majority of the publicly held shares voted against the merger, or another party
made a better offer. Id.
Hewing Co., 625 F. Supp. at 150.
Efros, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,118. At this
stage of the litigation, the claim was based on 14a-9 alone. Id. at 95,119.
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however, in that the injunction was denied,63 and the shareholders
approved the merger by the vote of 94.7% of the shares." Ms. Efros's
action was later consolidated with an action brought by the Howing
Company and Douglas McLellan, two Wall Street veterans. 5 The
combined case, in which the plaintiffs claimed a violation of Items 7, 8,
and 9 of Schedule 13E-3," reached the district court in 1985.' The
district court dismissed their case on summary judgment, and McLellan
and Howing appealed, Ms. Efros did not."
The Sixth Circuit heard Howing's case for the first time in early
October of 1986 (Howing )6' and released its decision almost a year

later. As a result of its decision in Howing I, the Sixth Circuit became the
first court of appeals in the nation to recognize an implied private right
of action under section 13(e).7 ' While the court realized that other
federal courts were reluctant to imply private rights of action, it believed
that the factors favoring recognition under section 13(e) so dominated all
others that recognition was justified in this case.71 Principal among these
"Id. at 95,121. In a remarkably prescient comment foreseeing the controversy in
Hewing 11I, District Judge Rubin observed:
Although it might be argued that any omission or misrepresentation in the
proxy materials is irrelevant for purposes of injunctive relief, since Nationwide
Mutual has sufficient votes to approve the merger on its own, we decline to
adopt such a position. ... [W]e conclude that there is a sufficient causal
relationship between the proxy materials and the merger to proceed with our
inquiry.
Id. at 95,119.
Hewing I, 826 F.2d 1470, 1472 (6th Cir. 1987).
Id. The Howing Company and Mr. McLellan are somewhat less sympathetic
plaintiffs than Belle Pfros. The Howing Company is a New York partnership that was
managed by a Mr. Hirsch, who had controlled industrial and commercial real estate for
thirty years. Douglas McLellan was an attorney who had previously been a vice president
of an investment bank and an investment advisor at a securities finn. One commentator
noted on the result of Hewing I that "[ilt
is a pity that the Howing court ignored
McLellan's and Hirsch's sophistication and expertise in financial and securities matters as
it rushed to allow them the protection of Section 13(e):' Kofele-Kale, supra note 31, at
645.
wSee Kofele-Kale, supranote 31, at 669-70 (discussing disclosure obligations under
Items 7, 8, and 9 of Schedule 13E-3). Plaintiffs also pursued a state law claim for breach
of fiduciary duty. Efros, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,120.
Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 625 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
'aHwing L1, 972 F.2d 700, 702 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1645
(1993).
Hwing I, 826 F.2d 1470, 1470 (6th Cir. 1987).
Id.at 1474. The court noted that the district court avoided the issue by assuming
that a private right of action for § 13(e) existed. Id.
71 See id. at 1474-76.
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factors was that the drafting of section 13(e), which had been modeled
after section 14(a),72 occurred soon after the Supreme Court implied a
private right of action under 14(a) in J.L Case v. Borak.73
After finding an implied private right of action under section 13(e),
the Sixth Circuit addressed the more complex question of whether
Nationwide had violated Rule 13e-3.74 The gravamen of this question
was whether Nationwide had followed the provisions of Schedule 13E3.75 While admitting that a summary of the items required by Schedule
13E-3 is usually sufficient, the court distinguished Items 7, 8, and 9 in
that the very "rationale behind complete disclosure ...[was] that they go
to the essence of the transaction."76 However, the court found that

Nationwide had met the dictates of both Item 7, requiring disclosure of
the reasons for the merger and for its form,' and Item 9, requiring
disclosure of the contributions of outside parties.7'
The problem was Nationwide's degree of compliance with Item 8."

Nationwide's proxy statement had noted that the offered price of $42.50
per share represented a premium over market price."0 In fact,
immediately before the announcement of the plans for the merger on
November 3, Nationwide's stock had traded for $28 per share. Because
the offered price represented a 51.8% premium over market, was 12.1

7' See supra notes 4 and 25 (discussing the legislative history behind § 13(e) and
Rule 13e-3).
73 Howing I, 826 F.2d at 1475. Section 13(e) was adopted in 1967, three years after
the Court's decision in J.1.
Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). The argument for
implying a private right of action is that when Congress modeled § 13(e) after § 14(a) it
knew that the Court had implied a private right of action under § 14(a). Thus, Congress
must have expected the courts to imply a private right of action under § 13(e) as well. See
Hawing I, 826 F.2d at 1475.
74See Hewing I, 826 F.2d at 1476-79.
7sSee supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text (outlining some of the requirements
under Schedule 13E-3).
76Hewing I, 826 F.2d at 1477.
' Id. The district court noted four business purposes of the merger. (1) the
elimination of the potential for conflicts of interests resulting from Nationwide's
increasing connections with the Nationwide group of insurance companies; (2) additional
flexibility for management; (3) greater efficiency due to the merger of the management
structures of Nationwide Corporation and Nationwide Mutual; and (4) the elimination of
the costs associated with the SEC requirements for publicly traded corporations. Howing
Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 625 F. Supp. 146, 152 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
7' Hawing I, 826 F.2d at 1479.
7'
See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (describing the requirements under
Item 8).
'0Hewing I, 826 F.2d at 1483 (Guy, J., dissenting) (quoting Nationwide's proxy
statement of December 9, 1982).
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times Nationwide's previous year's earnings per share of $351, and was
106% of per share book value,8' Nationwide contended that it had made

full disclosure.'
Noting Schedule 13E-3's declaration that mere "conclusory
statements" are not enough,' the Sixth Circuit stated that "if any of the
sources of value indicate a value higher than the value of the
consideration offered to unaffiliated security holders,"' such sources
should be addressed in the proxy statement. The court expressed concern
that Nationwide had failed to address factors85 other than the ones
favorable to it and had failed to assign weights to any of the factors."
The Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for a finding on

the materiality of the omissions from Item 8's requirements and for
further consideration of state law claims of breach of fiduciary duty.'
Although the conflict might have been resolved had the district court
allowed the case to go to the jury, the district court, instead, granted

summary judgment for the defendant on the issue of materiality.' Thus,

" Howing Co., 625 F. Supp. at 150.
8'Id.

Howing I, 826 F.2d at 1478.
" Id. (quoting Exchange Act Release No. 34-17719, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
23,709, at 17,245-28 (Apr. 13, 1981)).
SSWhen it next heard the case in 1991, the court addressed the specific factors that
Nationwide should have included in its proxy statement One factor was that insurance
companies usually sell at three to four times book value, rather than the 1.025 multiplier
produced by the $42.50 price. See Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 927 F.2d 263, 26667 (6th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Howing 1].
" Howing I, 826 F.2d at 1478. Even though Item 8 only requires the weighing of the
factors "to the extent practicable," see 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100, Item 8(b), Instructions
(1992), the court's concern seems to be valid. The Nationwide proxy statement had read:
Although the Evaluation Committee did not give specific weight to each of the
various factors considered in evaluating the fairness of the proposed merger,
particular emphasis was placed upon the receipt of the opinion of First Boston.
Howing I, 826 F.2d at 1479. Practicalities do not require Nationwide to abrogate its
responsibilities. The court quotes First Boston's entire opinion letter, which is filled with
conclusory statements noting that First Boston considered numerous factors including, but
not limited to, the 'historical financial record, operating statistics, [and] current financial
position!' of Nationwide. Id. at 1485. While every shareholder received a copy of that
letter, the letter merely listed different factors without explaining each factor's
significance. The Sixth Circuit clearly envisions a much more detailed analysis than that
which Nationwide gave.
'7 Howing I, 826 F.2d at 1481.
" Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,858, at 94,656 (S.D. Ohio 1989). The standard for judging materiality is that
'3
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the litigants found themselves arguing before the Sixth Circuit again late

in 1990 (Howing H)." In its opinion, released in 1991, the court again
overturned the district court and ruled that, because of the financial
interests at stake in Rule 13e-3 transactions, ° omissions from Item 8 are

presumptively material.9 The court concluded that summary judgment
was not proper because the defendant had not sufficiently rebutted this
presumption.'
Whether the district court would have let the case go to the jury at
last, we shall never know. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated
the judgment of Howing /and remanded the case for the Sixth Circuit93
to reconsider in light of the Supreme Court's intervening ruling in

Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg.'
II.

CAUSATION OF HARM:

SOMETHING LEss THAN CAUSE iN FACT

Of the two principal holdings in Virginia Bankshares,' the Sixth
Circuit correctly perceived9 the relevant ruling to be that a member of
a class of minority shareholders whose votes were not required to

authorize the corporate action subject to the proxy solicitation could not
show causation of damages from inadequate disclosure;'

this ruling

"[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote." TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
'9 927 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1991).
-See supra note 3 (describing freeze-out mergers); supra notes 32-37 and
accompanying text (describing the application of § 13(e) to freeze-out mergers).
9' See Hewing 1I, 927 F.2d at 265. The court found that the specificity of the
requirements in Item 8 created the presumption. Id.; see supra notes 46-49 and
accompanying text (describing Item 8 requirements).
"2Hewing I, 927 F.2d at 269-70.
' Nationwide Corp. v. Howing Co., 112 S. Ct. 39 (1991).
" 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991).
9' Hwing 11M,972 F.2d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1645
(1993). The holding in Virginia Bankshares that was not relevant to the issue in Howing
concerned materiality. In Virginia Bankshares, the Supreme Court held that 'Imowingly
false statements of reasons may be [material] even though conclusory in form." 111 S.
Ct. at 2755. The Sixth Circuit had ruled basic information about the value of shares in
a company (book, going concern and liquidation values) presumptively material in
Hewing ff. Hawing ff, 927 F.2d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 1991). The information held material
in Hawing ff, however, was not statements of reasons. Consequently, the materiality
holding of Virginia Bankshares was not relevant.
See Hawing X1,972 F.2d at 704.
See Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2766.
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went to the heart of the Homing plaintiffs' claim. From the very
beginning, Nationwide Mutual and Nationwide Mutual Fire had sufficient
votes to effect the merger. If the Supreme Court's decision was absolute,
then the preceding ten years of litigation had been a waste. In ruling that
the plaintiffs' claim was still viable, the Sixth Circuit narrowly interpreted
Virginia Bankshares and considered questions that had been debated for
a quarter of a century.
The seminal case on causation of damages in this context is Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co.9s In Mills, minority shareholders of Auto-Lite
sued to set aside Auto-Lite's merger with its majority and controlling
stockholder, Mergenthaler Linotype Company. The plaintiffs claimed that
the merger occurred because Auto-Lite violated Rule 14a-9 by issuing a
materially misleading proxy statement which carried its directors'
recommendation of the merger but did not mention that all eleven of
them were Mergenthaler appointees." Finding that Mergenthaler owned
and controlled approximately 54% of Auto-Lite's shares, the Court noted
that a two-thirds majority of the shares was needed for approval of the
merger."w Consequently, the proxies obtained through the proxy
statement had provided the votes needed for the merger to occur.
The lower courts in Mills had encountered difficulty on the question
of causation."' Under traditional concepts of liability, in order to claim
damages for a misrepresentation, one had to show that but for the
misrepresentation the damages would not have occurred. In other words,
the misrepresentation had to be the sine qua non or cause in fact of the
damages. 2 However, when damages are claimed to have arisen from
a proxy solicitation, proving cause in fact can be quite problematic. Proof
of the cause in fact was the difficulty encountered by the plaintiffs in
3
Mills."0
Before the shareholders' meeting on the merger, Auto-Lite had
obtained 317,000 votes through its proxy solicitation." The court of
appeals concluded that to determine whether the thousands of people who
gave proxies would have done so had they known that the directors were

"396 U.S. 375 (1970).
9

Id. at 378.

'DId. at 379.

.0.
See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 435-36 (7th Cir. 1968); Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 281 F. Supp. 826, 829-30 (N.D. IMI.1967).
1 For a general discussion of the tort of misrepresentation, see W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PRosSm AND KEEON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 106-109 (5th ed. 1984). For a
discussion of causation in fact, see id. § 41.
"'Mills, 396 U.S. at 380.
w4 Id at 379.
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scarcely disinterested was an impossible task Therefore, it held that if the
defendants could show that the terms of the merger were fair to the
minority shareholders, then the trial court could conclude that the proxies
would have been given even if the misrepresentation had not
occurred."0 5 Conversely, if the terms of the merger could not be shown
to be fair, then the trial court could conclude that the claim possessed the
requisite cause in fact.'06
Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, recognized that the appellate
court's approach would often make compliance with Rule 14a-9
unnecessary." 7 Equally, the Court recognized the inherent difficulty in
actions based upon inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitations of proving
cause in fact; thus, the Court opted for an entirely different avenue.
Finding that there was no need to prove that "the defect actually had a
decisive effect on the voting," ' the Court held:
Where there has been a finding of materiality,0 9 a shareholder has
made a sufficient showing of causal relationship between the violation
and the injury for which he seeks redress if,
as here, he proves that the
proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect in the
solicitation materials, was an essential link in the accomplishment of the
transaction.'
In other words, once a court had found that the inadequacy in the proxy
statement was material,..' causation would turn on whether the proxy
solicitation was an "essential link" in completing the transaction, rather
than on a showing of reliance on the part of the voting shareholders. This
"essential link' formulation obviates the need to prove cause in fact by
effectively reducing a plaintiff's burden to a showing that the violation

'0' See id. at 380.

Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1968).
07Once the shareholders' meeting was held and the merger approved, the lack of full

"

disclosure would become irrelevant. The corporation could then escape liability to the
shareholders by showing that the terms of the merger were fair. Such an approach would
discount the value of the shareholders' judgment, id.at 381, and frustrate the
congressional policy behind the disclosure rules. Id. at 383.
10 Id. at 385.
109 The Court believed that when an omission in a proxy statement had been shown
to be '!nateria1," much of the purpose in requiring proof of causation had already been
accomplished. The materiality requirement would ensure that the omission had a
"significant propensity to affect the voting process," and thus eliminate trivial claims. Ia
at 384.
110Id. at 385.

. For the general standard of materiality, see supra note 88.
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occurred in a context such that it might have been the cause in fact of the
plaintiff's injury. The Court also stressed that the "essential link"
formulation furthers the policy behind the disclosure rules, -which values
informed shareholders, by "resolving doubts in favor of those the statute
is designed to protect."' "
The Supreme Court recognized in Mills that a plaintiff in a 14a-9 action
must establish that a violation of the rule caused his injury. The plaintiff
could satisfy this requirement by showing that the proxy solicitation was an
"essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction!' for which the proxy
was sought.113 Thus, where the faction seeking such a transaction initially
lacked the requisite number of votes, proof of a material misstatement or
omission in a proxy statement made the showing of the causal connection
between the proxy statement and a shareholder's injury fairly easy. In order
to meet his burden of showing that the proxy solicitation was the "essential
link," an injured shareholder would simply have to present evidence of the
faction insufficient number of votes. The Court expressly acknowledged,
however, that it was not deciding "whether causation could be shown where
the management controls a sufficient number of shares to approve the
transaction without any votes from the minority." 4
Therefore, at least one question that remained unanswered in the wake of
Mills was under what circumstances a proxy solicitation could be an essential
link in the accomplishment ofthe transaction where management had control.
In Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,"5 the Second Circuit found that
had the defendants complied with Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9 and made full
disclosure, the plaintiffl would have had enough information to launch or
threaten to launch a damaging public relations campaign that would have
stopped the merger. Consequently, the defendants' violations of lOb-5 and
14a-9 allowed the merger to be completed by depriving the plaintiffs of the
opportunity to take advantage of this nonlegal remedy."6 Although Schlick

Mills, 396 U.S. at 385.
See id. at 385.
..Id. at 385 n.7.
"2

13

507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). Schlick concerned
a merger involving Continental Steel Corporation, in which the defendant was a majority
and controlling stockholder. The plaintiffs contended that the defendant had forced
Continental into a merger agreement with an exchange ratio based upon the '!manipulated
1"

and artificial stock values of the merging parties." Id at 376. The alleged defect in the

proxy statement, which was issued in connection with the merger, was that it dhd not
"disclose the manner in which Penn-Dixie had inflated the value of its shares at the
expense of Continental." Id. at 377.
"6 See id. at 384. The court noted. "We cannot assume that even a rapacious
controlling management would necessarily want to hang its dirty linen out on the line and
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only addressed available nonlegal remedies, in the case of a merger
preceded by a proxy solicitation, one could also argue that inadequate

disclosure in the proxy statement so deceived the minority shareholders
that they failed to take advantage of available legal remedies."' The
essential link would be that had they sought those legal remedies, the

transaction would not have occurred. For example, the most obvious
remedy would be an injunction preventing the holding of the
shareholders' meeting or the voting of the proxies. Also, a sufficiently
large number of minority shareholders might decide to seek a state
appraisal remedy such that the company involved would not have the
cash resources to complete the merger."'
A more subtle side of Mills' unanswered question involves whether
there might be a way to show a "causal relationship between the violation
and the [shareholder's] injury" without showing that "the proxy
solicitation ... was an essential link in the accomplishment of the

transaction."".9 In other words, the issue is whether the court may find
that the misleading proxy statement caused an injury even if it was not
"essential" to the transaction. In a situation where one party has control,
the deception of the shareholders may have no effect on the ultimate
outcome. Nevertheless, if some of the shareholders neglect to seek and

thus lose a state law appraisal remedy, they have still suffered harm.'
The Seventh Circuit, in Swanson v. American Consumer Industries,
Inc., 21 dealt with such a situation. The court held that a shareholder

thereby expose itself to suit or Securities Commission or other action-in terms of
reputation and future takeovers." Id.; see also Note, Causation and Liability in Private
Actions for Proxy Violations, 80 YALE L.J. 107, 117 (1970) ('Although the combined
vote of all the minority shareholders would not be enough to stop the transaction, the
unfavorable publicity ensuing from the revelation ...might [deter] management from
concluding the transaction for fear of damage to its reputation, credit standing, or business
image."). This theory in Sdzlick is similar to the theory that the Supreme Court rejected
in Virginia Bankshares. See infra notes 139-49 and accompanying text (discussing
Virginia Bankshares' analysis of this issue).
117 See

Note, supra note 116, at 118-20.

Id.
"' See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970).
120 See Note, supra note 116, at 125.
'21 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973). Plaintiffs were stockholders of Peoria Service
Company who challenged the sale of that corporation's assets to a company controlled by
American Consumer Industries ("ACr'). Through its subsidiary, ACI controlled 87% of
Peoria's stock. Regardless of ACI's degree of control, the plaintiffs claimed that the sale
had been accomplished by means of materially misleading proxy materials which violated
Rule lOb-5. Id. at 517. The court saw no causal connection between the proxy solicitation
and the merger. Id. at 518.
1
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who had failed to seek appraisal after receiving a materially misleading
proxy solicitation had proven a causal connection between the violation
of Rule lOb-5 and his injury.
The party violating the rule was then
liable for damages.
Another case, important not so much for establishing a causation
theory under an implied private cause of action as for limiting one, is
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores." As part of the resolution
of an antitrust suit, Blue Chip Stamps was ordered to offer stock to many
of the retailers who had previously used its stamp service. Although a
price had been set which was favorable to the buyers, only slightly more
than half of the shares offered were purchased. Manor Drug Stores and
others who neglected to buy some or all of the shares that Blue Chip
Stamps had offered to them sued claiming that Blue Chip Stamps had
violated Rule l0b-5.2 4 Specifically, the potential buyers claimed that
Blue Chip Stamps' offering prospectus was "materially misleading in its
overly pessimistic appraisal of Blue Chip's status and future
prospects."' As a result, they demanded the money that they would
have made had they bought the shares at the offered price.U
Blue Chip Stamps presented the Supreme Court with the question of
whether a person who had neither purchased nor sold securities could
maintain an action for a violation of 10b-5.' 7 Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion is replete with concerns that emanate from the
observation that the recovery sought by such a person would be one
"largely conjectural and speculative ... in which the number of shares
involved will depend on the plaintiff's subjective hypothesis.""ls Among
those concerns were: that suits would be filed solely for their "settlement
" This holding can be derived through a reading of a somewhat cryptic portion of
Swanson. The court began by noting that the causal connection between the proxy
statement and the sale rested on "an entirely different footing" than that between the

proxy statement and another injury, id. at 520, and that, after Mills, causation and reliance
were no longer "factually-to-be-proven'
predicates to recovery. Id. The court then
reasoned that the "obligation to disclose and [the] withholding of a material fact"
established causation. Id. at 521 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 154 (1972)). Finally, the court concluded "it is inescapable that plaintiff
shareholders have proven all the elements required to impress liability on defendants
under Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act and the Commission's Rule lOb-5
for loss of their informed ability to exercise their statutory appraisal rights.' Id.
n 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
m Id. at 726-27.
mId. at 726.
1Z Id. at 727.
'z Id. at 725; see supra note 23 (text of Rule lOb-5).
121Blue Chip Swmps, 421 U.S. at 734-35.
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value,"'" that parties would abuse the discovery process, 3 ' and that
courts would have to determine "many rather hazy issues of historical fact the
proof of which depended almost entirely on oral testimony.''.
The central theme of Blue Chip Stamps is that judicial interpretation of
a right of action must be much more cautious when the right of action
involved is implied rather than express. Rehnquist opined that the private
right under Rule lOb-5 was "ajudicial oak which has grown from little more
than a legislative acorn."' Rather than meaning to imply by this statement
that the right was not supported by congressional intent Rehnquist simply
meant that there was no congressional guidance concerning its
"contours."'3 Therefore, the right of action had to be "judicially delimitated
... unless and until Congress address[ed] the question.' ' " In shaping the
contours of the right, the Court looked to certain "policy considerations"' 35
Noting its concern about cases turning on speculative issues, the Court held
that those who had neither bought nor purchased securities could not maintain
a cause of action under Rule lOb-5.
While the question involved in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg 7 was the question left unanswered in Mills,M the soul of
irginia Bankshares derives from Blue Chip Stamps. Specifically, the issue
presented in Virginia Bankshares was whether a member of a class of
minority shareholders whose votes were not needed to approve a merger
between First American Bank of Virginia and Virginia Bankshares could
show "causation of damages compensable under § 14(a)"' 39 After
Id. at 740.

129

0 "[TIo the extent that [discovery] permits a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim

to simply take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so
representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasonably
founded hope that the process will reveal relevant evidence, it is a social cost rather than
a benefit." Id. at 741.

Id. at 743.
'3 Id. at 737.
133Id. at 749.
131

134

Id.

'

Id. at 737.

136

Id.

111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991). An excellent analysis of the irginiaBanlhares opinion
is contained in Eric G. Orlinsky, Note, Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg. The Golden
Rule ofSection 14(a), 47 Bus. LAw. 837 (1992). An additional analysis can be found in
Charles David Elliott, Note, Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg: Change in a Minority
Shareholder's Right to the Truth?, 52 LA. L. REV. 1045 (1992).
SSee supra text accompanying note 114 (discussing the remaining issue in light of
the Mills decision).
,9 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2755. Sandberg and the other plaintiffs were
137
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discussing implied private rights of action and the primacy of congressional
intent,14° the Court observed that there were great obstacles to finding
congressional intent in the midst of silence. However, since freezing the
contours of a private right "would be demonstrably inequitable to a class of
would-be plaintiffs With claims comparable to those previously
recognized, 141 the Court believed that the plaintiffs' claim warranted
consideration. The Court's guide in deciding whether a remedy
existed was
142
Blue Chip Stamps and the policy concerns that it addressed.
The respondents argued that the proxy statement requesting their vote in
favor of the merger was an essential link in the accomplishment of that
transaction" in that the parties behind the merger would have been
"unwilling to proceed without the approval" of the minority shareholders.'"
The minority' approval had only been obtained by means of a materially
misleading statement which had violated Rule 14a-9. The respondents
claimed that they were entitled to the full amount that they would have
received had the proxy statement complied with 14a-9.141 Finding that the
"same threats of speculative claims and procedural intractability" were present
in Sandberg's theory as existed inBlue Chip Stamps, Justice Souter unleashed
against Sandberg' theory the full force of the Court's fear of 'hazy' issues
inviting self-serving testimony, strike-suits, and protracted discovery."'" In
the terms of Mills, "the causal connection would depend on a desire to avoid
bad shareholder or public relations, and the essential character of the causal
link would stem not from the enforceable terms of the parties' corporate
relationship, but from one party's apprehension of the ill will of the
other."1 47 As a result, "[r]eliable evidence would seldom exist."'" "Given

shareholders of First American Bank of Virginia. First American Bankshares, Inc. owned
eighty-five percent of First American Bank and the public owned the remaining fifteen
percent First American Bankshares merged First American Bank into its subsidiary,
Virginia Bankshares, in a freeze-out merger. Id.; see supranote 3 (discussing "freezeout"

mergers).
140Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2763-64.
141Id. at 2764.
142See id.
14"Id. at 2762. The shareholders phrased their argument in terms of the often quoted

language
from Mills. Id.
44
Id. This theory is similar to that of Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d
374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). See supra notes 115-18 and
accompanying text (discussing Schlick).
14 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2756.
14"Id. at 2765; see supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text (discussing policy
concerns associated with the Blue Chip &tamps decision).
147 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2762.

'1 Id. at 2765. The Court articulated some of its concerns:
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a choice," wrote the Court, "we would reject any
theory of causation that
49
raised such prospects, and we reject this one."'
As an additional theory of causation, the respondents in Virginia

Bankshares claimed that the proxy statement was an essential link
because approval by the majority of the minority shareholders insulated

the merger from later attack under Virginia state law."s Rejecting this
claim without considering the causation issue, the Court found that if the

proxy statement had indeed been materially misleading, the merger would
not in fact be insulated from challenge in the Virginia courts.' Thus,
the solution to the question of whether a lost state remedy could satisfy
the Mills causation requirement would have to wait for another case.

II.

THE SIXTH Cmcurr's "SoLUTioN"

Just as Howing Isaw the Sixth Circuit adventurously become the first
court of appeals to find an implied private right of action in section 13(e)

after years of judicial reluctance to imply rights of action, 52 Howing LI
shows the Sixth Circuit at its boldest.1 That the Supreme Court
vacated the judgment of Howing H and remanded the case for

reconsideration in light of Virginia Bankshares strongly intimated that
there was no need for any further consideration of the Howing plaintiffs'
claim.154 Yet, rather than dismissing their claim, the Sixth Circuit

A subsequently dissatisfied minority shareholder would have virtual license to
allege that managerial timidity would have doomed corporate action but for the
ostensible approval induced by the misleading statement, and opposing claims
of hypothetical diffidence and hypothetical boldness on the part of directors
would probably provide enough depositions in the usual case to preclude any
judicial resolution short of the credibility judgments that can only come after
trial.
Id.

149 Id.

..Id. at 2762. Without minority approval the merger would have been voidable due
to a conflict of interest on the part of one of the bank's directors.
15.Id. at 2766 n.14. This was true only because Virginia statutes did not allow for an
appraisal remedy in bank mergers. Id.
152See supra text accompanying notes 25-31 (discussing a private right of action
under § 13(e)).
153 All three of the Sixth Circuit's.Howingcases were heard by three-judge panels.
Judges Merritt, Guy and Norris heard Hewing I, 826 F.2d 1470 (6th Cir. 1987), while
Hewing 1,927 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1991), and Hawing 1ff, 972 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1992),
were heard before Judges Merritt, Guy and Brown. Judge Guy dissented in all three cases.
" Very little was ever said about a lost state remedy in any of the Hewing cases. At
most, some of the early cases had mentioned that the plaintiffs had not exercised their
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became the first post-Virginia Bankshares court to rule directly on the
lost state remedy theory of causation 55
After briefly noting that Virginia Bankshares left open the question
of whether a member of a class of shareholders whose votes were not

needed to authorize a merger could show causation by way of a lost state

remedy,"s the Sixth Circuit quickly penetrated Virginia Bankshares'
analytical framework. Although it was unable to "derive a general
standard of causation from Virginia Bankshares,"'" the court did apply

Virginia Bankshares' analysis and observed that the Supreme Court had
identified "policy reasons" as the tool with which to define the scope of

implied private rights of action."

For the Sixth Circuit, the preeminent

sources containing these policy reasons were the opinions in Mills and
Virginia Bankshares. The Sixth Circuit viewed the latter as a warning to
beware of "speculative claims and procedural intractability."'- 9
Conversely, it saw the former as an exhortation to "avoid the
impracticalities" of requiring proof of precise causal relations while acting

state appraisal rights. See Hewing I, 826 F.2d 1470, 1472 (6th Cir. 1987); Hawing Co.
v. Nationwide Corp., 625 F. Supp. 146, 150 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
' The District of Columbia Circuit and the Third Circuit have both applied the
Virginia Bankshares causation holding and made rather far-reaching statements about its
effects, but in neither case was the issue of a lost state remedy present. See Roosevelt v.
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that
shareholders have a private right of action under § 14(a) to seek injunctive relief when
management refuses to include shareholder proposals in proxy materials); Scattergood v.
Perelman, 945 F.2d 618, 624 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Because the Supreme Court has held that,
when a majority shareholder of a company pursues a freeze-out merger, the chain of
causation between apre-merger misrepresentation and the price received under the merger
is broken, we will affui the judgment of the district court with respect to these claims.").
Indeed, the Third Circuit acknowledged that it was not deciding on a lost state injunction
remedy. Scattergood, 945 F.2d at 626 n.4. The District Court for the Northern District of
New York has issued a holding that involved the lost state remedy theory (in this case an
appraisal remedy), but only to the extent of noting that Virginia Banlhares did not
conclusively reject the theory. Believing that a lost state remedy theory might be valid,
the court denied a motion to reconsider the judgment of an earlier case. See Wilson v.
Great Am. Indus., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 85, 91 (N.D.N.Y. 1991), affdinpart,rev'd inpart,
979 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Virginia Bankshares expressly left open the question
whether shareholders who may have forfeited state law rights in approving a corporate
transaction might still have a cause of action under section 14(a).").
. Hewing iff, 972 F.2d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1645
(1993). Justice Souter explicitly wrote, "This case does not ... require us to decide
whether § 14(a) provides a cause of action for lost state remedies." Virginia Bankshares,
Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2766 (1991).
" Hewing Iff, 972 F.2d at 706-07.
I Id. at 707.
1Id
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in the service of resolving doubts in favor of those the law in question
was designed to protect.'6 °
The key to the plaintiffs maintaining their claims was an Ohio law

allowing dissenting shareholders to seek the appraisal of their shares
within ten days after the shareholders' meeting approving the merger.'
Their argument was that "the misleading proxy statement was an
'essential link' in their decisions not to pursue their appraisal
remedies."'" Although the plaintiffs had also tried to claim that this
theory presented no "dangers of speculation,"'"
the Sixth Circuit
recognized that some dangers were present. The theory "requires an
inference that, given full and fair disclosure, [the plaintiffs] would have
(1) voted against the transaction or not voted, thus qualifying for the
appraisal remedy; and (2) exercised their appraisal rights within the
statutorily prescribed ten-day time limitation.""' However, the court
found the speculation in this instance to be "no greater than that involved
in Mills."'165
According to the Sixth Circuit the Mills holding had created a
"conclusive presumption!' concerning the outcome of a vote on a
transaction if some minority votes are needed." In Mills, the Court
presumed that if a misstatement or omission in a proxy statement was
shown to be "material," such misstatement or omission would have been
considered by the reasonable shareholder in deciding how to vote on the
transaction. 67 As well, the theory rejected in Virginia Pankshares"
160 Id.
'61 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.85 (Anderson Supp. 1991). Dissenting shareholders
are those shareholders who object to a transaction that has been approved by a sufficient
number of shareholders for the transaction to occur. Many states have statutes which

allow shareholders who object to a transaction that would substantially change the
character of their shares (such as a merger or a sale of substantially all of the corporations

assets) to receive a judicially determined fair value for the shares. The process in which
a court would decide that fair value is called an appraisal. See, e.g., REV. MODEL
BUSiNESs CORP. Acr § 13.02 (1984).
162 Howing Ii, 972 F.2d at 708. The plaintiffs' argument again tracked
the often
quoted language from Mills.
163Id.
164

Id.

165Id.

'6 Id. at 707.
167

1

Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970).
Specifically, Virginia Bankshares rejected the plaintiffs' claim of a misleading

proxy because the plaintiff's votes were not necessary for approval of the transaction. See
supranotes 143-45 and accompanying text (describing the plaintiffs' argument in Virginia
Bankshares).
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had also created a presumption. The VirginiaBanksharesCourt presumed that
a showing by minority shareholders that, had they voted against the corporate
transaction, the directors would not have approved the transaction was too

speculative to ever be proven. 69 The difference between the two
presumptions "lies in the power to act."' 70 Like the Mills presumption, the

court remarked (in language echoing VirginiaBankshares)that "the Plaintiffs'
loss-of-state-law-remedy theory derives its causal link from the enforceable
terms-including the right to appraisal-of the parties' corporate
relationship' 7 Since the court concluded that adopting the lost state
remedy theory would resolve doubts in favor of the shareholders that section
13(e) was designed to protect and that the theory was not excessively
speculative," 7 the only question remaining was whether it was applicable

to the facts of Howing 117
In his dissent, Judge Guy strenuously challenged the notion that the
plaintiffs could rightly recover under a lost state remedy theory. Believing that

the facts did not "demonstrate an induced forfeiture of the appraisal remedy,"
he pointed out the plaintiffs' admission that they never believed that the price
offered for the stock was adequate. 73 Additionally, in the early stages of
the suit, the plaintiffs' counsel had stated that they chose to pursue their claim

in federal court rather than opting for state appraisal actions because they
believed that the former route was "more economical."' 74 For the majority,
however, this was unpersuasive. The plaintiffs' "decisions with respect to

appraisal might well have been different had they received the full and fair
disclosure to which they were entitled."' 75 In the language of Mills, the

' Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, Ill S. Ct 2749, 2765 (1991).
' Howing 11, 972 F.2d at 708.
171

Id.

See id. at 708-09. The court noted four sources in support of its conclusion:
First three current members of the Supreme Court have indicated their support
for the theory, while the remainder of the Court has not determined its merits.
Second, if... minority shareholders without sufficient voting power were
categorically unable to demonstrate causation, we believe the Court would have
resolved irginia Bankrhares on that broader ground. Third, the element of
speculation required by the Plaintiffs' theory is no greater than that required by
the theory accepted by the Court in Mills. Finally, we would be hesitant to hold
that Congress intended to provide the protection of an implied right of action,
but that causation could never be established in those cases where the minority
shareholders, lacking sufficient votes to block the transaction, had their greatest
need for such protection.
Id. at 709.
Id. at 711 (Guy, J., dissenting).
174Id.
171Id. at 710. Had the Supreme Court read the text ofHowing Imore closely it might
17
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court explained that "where there has been a finding of materiality, a
shareholder has made a sufficient showing of causal relationship [if] ...
he proves that the proxy solicitation was an essential link in the chain of
events that deprived him of his state-law remedy." '76 Therefore, the
court held that the Howing Company and McLellan had met their burden
of establishing causation."

IV.
A.

AN ANswER

What Virginia Bankshares Left Unresolved

In his opinion in Virginia Bankshares, Justice Souter mentioned as
examples of causation theories that the Court was not addressing those
which concerned either a foregone appraisal right78 or an unobtained
injunction that would have halted the merger.'79 In so doing, he was
essentially incorporating the two basic paths by which a plaintiff might
prove harm from a violation of either Rule 13e-3 or Rule 14a-9. One path
consists of theories designed to show that the proxy solicitation was an
essential link in the accomplishment of the merger for a reason other than
that it gave the faction advocating the merger the votes needed for
approval. 8 Falling under that rubric would be the theory rejected in
Virginia Bankshares' and a theory based upon an unsought
injunction."
have foreseen the Sixth Circuit's conclusion. The Sixth Circuit had noted that, in a freezeout merger situation, the appraisal option can not 'rationally be exercised unless the
majority is compelled to make fll disclosure regarding appraisals, earnings projections
and other information that sheds light on the value of the firm." Howing I, 826 F.2d 1470,

1476-77 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 255 (6th Cir. 1985),

cert. denied, 471 U.S. 903 (1986)).
'7' Hawing It, 972 F.2d at 709.
I.
Id. at 710.
'= Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2765 (1991). As an
example, Souter cited Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 475 F.2d 516 (7th
Cir. 1973). Id.; see supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Swanson case.
"9 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2765-66.
110 See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text (discussing the "essential link"
theory where majority shareholders have voting control).
1'" This theory involved the supposed desire of majority shareholders to avoid bad
relations with minority shareholders and the public. Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at
2762; see supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's rejection of
this theory).
1 A proxy solicitation which misled a minority shareholder into not seeking an
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The other path a plaintiff might use to prove harm, seeking to show
that the proxy solicitation was an essential link, involves foregone

appraisal rights. If a proposed merger does not involve a freeze-out, there
may not be sufficient funds to purchase many shares. Since a misleading
proxy solicitation might convince a substantial number of shareholders
not to exercise their appraisal rights, it could be described as an essential

link in that it would keep the transaction from being subject to
threatening financial drain." This path would be especially relevant
where the transaction is inevitable but the harm to a particular shareholder

resulting from inadequate disclosure is not.'"
B. Analyzing the Sixth Circuit'sAnalysis
In Howing 1H,the Sixth Circuit attempted to explain its holding by
using the language of Mills and stating that the proxy solicitation had
been an essential link in the series of events that deprived the plaintiffs
of their appraisal remedy.'85 Certainly, that is one of the more

confusing explanations that the court could have provided. The court's
explanation is confusing because it uses the concept of an essential step
in a causal sequence in a different context than that of Mills. In Mills, the

causal chain ended in the accomplishment of the transaction; Howing 11s
injunction could qualify as an essential link because it would prevent the merger from
being judicially frozen. However, based on urginia Banlhares, a court would most
likely reject an essential link theory involving a foregone injunction as well. An injunction
would only stay the merger until disclosure which complied with the securities laws had
been made. Once it had, the faction with the votes needed to approve the merger would
use them and the merger would occur. The only conceivable hindrance would be that,
during the period in which the injunction was in effect, the amount of bad publicity which
resulted would dissuade the controlling party from completing the transaction. Such a
possibility then relies upon the same Schlick-type theory that YIrginia Bankshares
repudiated. Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2765.
" In fact, the possibility of appraisal actions draining funds can be a serious problem
for a merger supported with limited resources. See Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's
Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 234-38 (1962). Further,
some '!merger plans expressly provide for termination if a certain percentage of
shareholders exercise or take steps to exercise appraisal rights." Note, supra note 116, at
118.
12
This path was used by the plaintiffs in Swanson v. American Consumer Indus.,
Inc., 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973). In Swanson, the court ruled that a violation of the
disclosure rules caused the plaintiffs to lose the higher price that they would have
received for their shares had they exercised their appraisal rights. See id. at 521; see supra
notes 121-22 and accompanying text (for a discussion of the Swanson case).
...
Howing ff1, 972 F.2d 700, 709 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1645
(1993).
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seems not to lead to the transaction, but merely to the loss of the remedy.
Thus, it appears that just as the Supreme Court in Mills formulated one
broad method to show causation, the Sixth Circuit was trying to create
another.
The basis of an argument that a proxy solicitation was an essential
link in the loss of a state law remedy in Howing 1ll would include the
following facts: (1) there was a freeze-out merger covered by Rule 13e-3;
(2) Rule 13e-3 requires disclosure to be made in a proxy statement or
other form of communication; 86 (3) the disclosure made in the proxy
statement sent to the shareholders was inadequate; (4) due to the merger,
the plaintiffs were given the opportunity to have their shares appraised in
state court; and (5) the plaintiffs did not utilize that opportunity. Based
on these facts, the proxy solicitation was certainly an essential link in the
chain of events leading to the plaintiffs' possession of an appraisal right
and their subsequent loss of it. However, unlike the question of whether
the proxy solicitation was an essential link in the accomplishment of the
transaction, under these facts the proxy solicitation would always be an
essential link in the loss of the appraisal right. Therefore, the "essential
link" language is unnecessary. Like Swanson v. American Consumer
Industries, Inc., ' Howing 1H7 only requires that a plaintiff show that
there was a material violation of the disclosure rules in order to prove
harm resulting from a lost appraisal right."8
Since the Sixth Circuit's causation theory in Howing I/would expand
beyond Mills the class of plaintiffs able to recover, the theory must be
submitted to the "policy reasons" analysis of Blue Chip Stamps in order
to determine if the extension is permissible under Virginia
8 9 The Sixth Circuit attached a great deal of importance to
Bankshares."
the fact that its theory drew "its causal link from the enforceable terms
... of the parties' corporate relationship.""' Undoubtedly, this is an
important fact under Virginia Bankshares for it tends to reduce the risk

...
See supra note 21 (discussing items requiring disclosure under Rule 13e-3).
'" 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973); see supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text

(discussing the Swanson decision).
1

See Hewing 11, 972 F.2d at 709.

189

See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 728, 737-49 (1975).

' Id. at 708. In Virginia Bankshares, the Court stated that the Mills theory came
from the enforceable terms of the corporate relationship because, in Mills, the approval
of a certain percentage of the shares was needed to effect the merger. See Virginia
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S.Ct. 2749, 2762 (1991). In Hewing HI,however, the
right to seek appraisal rights emanated from the enforceable terms of the corporate
relationship that were supplied by the state in which Nationwide operated. See Hawing
//,972 F.2d at 709.
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of "speculative claims and procedural intractability"''
that so
concerned the Court in Blue Chip Stamps."9 Other factors, though,
might still make this risk significant.
One factor, particularly prominent in Blue Chip Stamps, that would
increase the risk of speculative claims and procedural intractability is the
opportunity for "self-serving testimony."' 93 The. reason for its
prominence is that when someone claims damages for being misled into
not buying or selling stock, there is no "objectively demonstrable
fact"' on which to base recovery. A court would have to depend upon
the plaintiff's oral testimony concerning both whether he would have
bought or sold a security absent a misrepresentation and the number of
shares involved.' 95 In Mills and Howing ffI, however, oral testimony
would only be needed to show whether the plaintiffs would have given
their proxies or exercised their appraisal rights.'
Therefore, the
causation theories in both of these cases pose a lesser risk of speculative
claims than that advanced in Blue Chip Stamps.
After acknowledging that there was a speculative element in the
plaintiffs' causation theory,'97 the Sixth Circuit wrote that this element
made the theory "no more speculative than [the theory] in Mills, and less
so than the one rejected by the court in Virginia Bankshares."'95 By
equating the speculative aspects of the Mills and Howing 1Hl theories, the
court appears to be saying that it is as easy to accept a shareholder's
testimony that he would have exercised an appraisal right had he not been
misled as it is to accept that he would not have given his proxy under

'' Frginia Bankshares,
m

111 S. Ct. at 2765.
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 743-49 (1978).

Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2765; see Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 743
("We in no way disparage the worth and frequent high value of oral testimony when we
say that dangers of its abuse appear to exist in this type of action to a peculiarly high

degree.).
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 747.
ue A court would have to determine both the number of shares that would have been
bought and the number of shares that would have been sold. Uncertainties would include
how many shares a person would have bought and whether a shareholder would have
sought or could have obtained financing. Even the maximum shares that one would have
sold would be a question of fact for dispute. For example, an investor might testify that
he was on the verge of making a contract for a fiture sale of the security when the
company released misleadingly positive information which deterred him.
"6 A proxy or appraisal action normally applies to all of the stock that an investor
owns in a particular company.
'97 Howing Xf,972 F.2d 700, 708 (6th Cir. 1992), cert."
denied, 113 S.CL 1645
(1993).
'

'"id.
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similar circumstances. However, the decision of whether to seek an appraisal
remedy is a fundamentally more complex decision than the decision of
whether to grant a proxy. Granting a proxy only requires a shareholder to
consider the issues on which a vote will be held, sign a form, and mail it to
the company. Exercising an appraisal right, on the other hand, often involves
participation in a protracted process, up-front costs, and an indeterminate
return.'99 One commentator has even suggested that although the values
produced by an appraisal usually exceed the market value of a stock,
appraisal proceedings are relatively rare due to these hindrances?' In fact,
the procedural problems of seeking appraisal have led many dissenting
shareholders to seek a higher price for their shares by suing under a private
right of action implied from the securities disclosure laws?"0
Finally, the Sixth Circuit's assertion that the theory of Howing Li7 is less
speculative than the theory in Virginia Bankshares is questionable. If the
presumption of Howing 11 is applied,2° as the presumption was in Mills,
as an assumption about what most reasonable shareholders would have done,
then the speculation required to adopt it can be seen as quite high. In a
nonfreeze-out merger, where there are limited funds available for buying the
stock of dissenting shareholders, HowingHIstheory would automatically lead
to a conclusion that the merger would not have occurred had there been a
sizable number of shares in minority hands. Even Justice Kennedy, in his
Virginia Bankshares dissent, wrote that the theory that under state law "the
merger would have been voidable absent minority shareholder approval" was
more speculative than the theory that the majority rejected?"

' See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management
in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1, 85 (1969); Going Private
Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, Exchange Act Release No. 3414185, 42 Fed. Reg. 60,090, 60,091-60,092 (Nov. 23, 1977) ("[Iln practice [the appraisal]
remedy is often cumbersome, expensive and ineffective."); Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc.,
533 F.2d 1283, 1297-98 n.4 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)
('The Delaware statute is typical. The public shareholders are afforded no right to
equitable relief under the statute and therefore are totally dependent upon the valuation
figure settled upon by the appraiser.").
' See Joel Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
829, 856-57 (1984). Although this suggestion is tempered by the author having only

included 'reported" cases in his study, the author strongly implies that appraisal actions
are just as infrequent among unreported cases. See id. at 829.
201 See id. at 831.
= The presumption of Hawing Iff is that the plaintiff shareholders, if given full and
fair disclosure, would have (1) voted against the transaction, or not voted at all, and (2)
exercised their appraisal rights within the ten-day statutory time limitation. See Hawing
in,972 F.2d at 708.
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2773 (1991) (Kennedy,
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CONCLUSION

Despite the hgh degree of speculation m the HowmngII1theory, the Sixth
Circuit accepted the theory by relying on the policy consideration of Mills
that doubts should be resolved m favor of those the laws were designed to
protect. Notwithstanding the fact that Virginia Banksharesidentifies Blue
Chip Stamps as the source from wich the relevant policy concerns are to be
2
gleaned,
Justice Souter specifically rejected the argument for inferring
congressional intent m the face of congressional silence. The Virginia
Banksharesopinion explained that when Congress wished to protect certain
classes of individuals, it know how to do so.206 In the face of congressional
silence, arguments for adoption of causal theories to expand the class of
plaintis must meet the test of Blue Chip Stamps. The Sixth Circuit's theory
m Howng 111 fails this test.
Campbell Connell

J., dissenting).
' See Howing 11, 972 F.2d 700, 708 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. dened, 113 S. Ct. 1645.
20

See YIrgima Banrshares, 111 S. CL at 2764.

' See id.

